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Abstract
Can information be objective and/or subjective? Based on Patrick 
Wilson’s notion of public knowledge and a story of a sign on a tree, 
this paper argues that private information is not the same as subjective 
information, and that the very communicative process of making in-
formation makes information objective. It also argues that the objec-
tive sense of information—public knowledge—has been and will be 
most relevant to information science, hence questions concerning 
collective responsibility in collecting, preserving, and organizing 
information shall be considered.
Introduction
“Is information objective or subjective/situational?” Hjørland (2007) asks 
in a paper in response to Bates’s (2005, 2006) two papers on the con-
cept of information. Hjørland maintains that informativeness is an essential 
quality of the concept of information: “To consider something information 
is thus always to consider it as informative in relation to some possible questions” 
(p. 1451; emphasis in original). Indeed, the situational view of infor-
mation has been explained and explored from various perspectives for 
many decades (see, for example, Blair, 2006; Buckland, 1991; Ma, 2012a; 
Machlup, 1983; Mai, 2013; Swanson, 1986; Wilson, 1973) and is important 
for both research and practical work in information science because it 
considers the cultural and social nature of information. Nevertheless, al-
though I do not totally agree with the concepts of information that Bates 
(2005, 2006) proposed, I am intrigued by her quest to find “a way to think 
about information that effectively allows for both subjective and objective 
perspectives” (2005). Can information be subjective and/or objective?
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The suggestion of objective information would probably elicit some 
negative reactions immediately. For decades, there has been a constant 
struggle for humanists in information science (IS) to be heard and rec-
ognized (see, most recently, Feinberg, Furner, Mai, & Tennis, 2012). For 
humanists and qualitative social scientists, objective seems to be a bad word 
in and of itself. But this is not and should not be the case. As I have ar-
gued previously (Ma, 2012b), “Information is not objective, subjective, or 
normative ‘in itself’ because the term plays different roles in relation to 
different ontological referents and so has different types of validity claims 
that are appropriate for different types of research” (p. 1865). We can 
identify instances of information being an objective entity, as well as the 
subjective and normative affordances that shape and make possible it be-
ing considered as information. In fact, the notion of information-as-thing 
suggests the situational understanding of information as an objective en-
tity in information systems (Buckland, 1991; see also, Ma, 2010). Hence, 
the formal ontological categories suggested are well-suited for analyzing 
instances of information—for example, a book, an ephemera collection, 
or a database. However, this paper is less concerned with instances of in-
formation or information as an objective entity; rather, the question is, 
how does information become objective through communicative action? 
In this paper, information is understood as Wilson’s (1977) notion of public 
knowledge, and I will use the two terms interchangeably. 
Before we move on to the discussion of public knowledge, it is impor-
tant to make clear that the concept of public knowledge is not to be con-
fused with knowledge, however. In Wilson’s words, 
According to the standard analysis, knowledge is at the very least true 
belief; knowledge implies truth, and where there is no belief, there is 
no knowledge. But we are allowing things to be part of public knowledge 
that are unknown to, and hence not believed by, anyone. And what is 
unmistakably part of public knowledge at a given time not only may 
turn out not to be true, but may even be strongly suspected at the 
time not to be true. . . . Public knowledge does not imply truth and, 
therefore, is not knowledge. (p. 6; emphasis added) 
Further to Wilson’s definition, I argue that public knowledge can be tan-
gible or intangible and so is not necessarily in documentary forms and 
can be a practice—for example, intangible cultural heritage as defined 
by UNESCO.
Tangible or intangible, public knowledge is produced through com-
municative action and has to be constructed. In this paper, I argue that 
the very communicative process of making information is what makes in-
formation objective, and that this sense of information (public knowledge) 
has been and will be most relevant to IS. We will explore the objective 
sense of information by looking at a sign on a tree—in particular, how the 
sign transforms from private information to public knowledge through 
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communicative action, while also explaining the distinction between pri-
vate and subjective information. 
Let us begin with a story about a sign on a tree. 
A Sign on a Tree
There is a sign on a tree. The sign is left by a friend of mine. The sign 
is information to me, and, supposedly, only my friend and I know the 
meaning of it. There is no need for me to communicate this information 
to others, and this information is only shared with me. The sign signifies 
edible tree leaves and is going to help me survive in the next few days of 
outdoor adventure in the woods. Others would not understand what this 
sign means; in fact, they may not even notice at all that there is a sign. The 
information is private.
The sign on a tree is information because of its potential to inform 
me. It is information also because it is used for facilitating the exchange 
of meaning (Mai, 2013), despite the fact that the sign is for the exchange 
of meaning between my friend and me only. The information is private 
because the existence and the meaning of the sign are not shared with 
others. It is like a note to oneself, a scribble that only I can decipher. It is 
information for me only—at least that is what my friend has intended it 
to be. Also, my need for the sign on a tree—the information—is temporal 
because I am only going to be in the woods for a few days. As a matter of 
fact, I will not need the sign—the information—once I can identify the 
edible leaves, when I know how to identify edible leaves in this particular 
forest. The need for information will disappear, and so will the informa-
tion—the sign will become useless. It is like scratching off the scribble in 
my notebook once it does not represent a piece of information any more.
Although there have been many discussions about the concept of in-
formation in IS, there has not been conceptual discussion about private 
information. Practically speaking, it seems to make sense not to discuss 
private information because most information systems do not deal with 
private information; rather, they are concerned with information that we 
want to collect, store, preserve, and organize for present and future re-
trieval. Unless the scribble in my notebook or the sign on a tree turns 
out to be useful or entertaining for public consumption, or something 
important in history, there is no point in collecting, storing, preserving, 
and organizing the temporal and private information. 
Nevertheless, there are two important reasons to consider private in-
formation conceptually. First, we can investigate the notion of subjective in-
formation against private information. Although there seems to be some 
level of agreement about the discursive construction of information, clari-
fications of the differences between subjective and private information 
are lacking. The two concepts are seemingly overlapping and synonymous 
in many discussions. The confusion is unfortunate because the two con-
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cepts invoke different research questions and different methodologies 
concerning the study of information. Second, the conceptualization of 
private information provides the background in explicating the communi-
cative process of constructing information in information systems—in par-
ticular, the situational understanding of information-as-thing (Buckland, 
1991). For the very act of databasing (Bowker, 2005) implies there is an 
agreement as to what ought to be known and retrieved at present and in the 
future, and so data are collected, stored, preserved, and organized for 
their potential to inform. 
Private versus Subjective Information
Let us first consider private information. How and when is information pri-
vate? Information is private when its meaning is shared by at least two peo-
ple (including the present and future self) or a group of people but is not 
known or understood by others in a community. The information is private 
because the meaning of such only works in a closed communication system, 
but the creation of such information can be intended or unintended. 
When I lived in the university residence a long time ago, once in a 
while I would see milk bottles left outside of room 319. I vaguely knew 
that the bottles signified something for the roommates of that room, but 
the meaning was not shared with me; it was private information shared 
among the occupants of room 319. Like the sign on a tree, the mean-
ing of the sign was only shared privately. The private information existed 
within a communication system, and the creation and inscription of such 
information was intended. Also, consider a codebook that a schoolboy 
created to communicate with his friends. The rationale for creating and 
using the codebook was to encrypt communication such that no one else 
other than those who were given the codebook would understand the 
meaning of the encrypted messages. The creation of this private informa-
tion was also intended.
Yet, private information can be unintended. Say, David has a somewhat 
awkward habit of turning his coffee cup upside down as a way of saying “I 
have had too much coffee today already.” Everyone in the family knows 
about the meaning of the upside-down cup and is accustomed to seeing 
it on the breakfast table. A houseguest, however, would be surprised, even 
baffled, by David’s act—that is, until the meaning of the upside-down cup 
is explained. After which, the meaning of the upside-down cup is now 
shared not only among family members but also with the houseguest; and 
the meaning is understood as such in a particular setting. We do not usu-
ally consider this information public, however, unless it conveys the same 
meaning to a larger community. For example, in the North American 
context, one does not turn the cup upside down in order to let the waiter 
know that you have had too much coffee for the day and do not want 
more refills. 
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Nevertheless, private information must be interpreted situationally. If a 
child sees the very same sequence of codes that look like the ones he has 
been exchanging with his friends on a family vacation in Italy, he would 
not think that his friend is sending him a message there. And David’s 
family would not consider that all the upside-down cups in a restaurant 
mean that people have had too much coffee. Private information must 
and has to be understood within certain contexts. When private informa-
tion is seen out of context, the sign—the secret codes, the coffee cup, and 
the sign on a tree—becomes meaningless, or conveys completely different 
meanings. 
But is private information subjective? Let us look up the definition of 
private and subjective in the Oxford English Dictionary:
Private: Restricted to one person or a few persons as opposed to the 
wider community; largely in opposition to public.
Subjective: Of, relating to, or proceeding from an individual’s thoughts, 
views, etc.; derived from or expressing a person’s individuality or idio-
syncrasy; not impartial or literal; personal, individual.
 Subjective information is information that shapes our mind with our own 
interpretation and understanding in relation to one’s feelings, intentions, 
and opinions. When we encounter artistic forms of expression, such as 
music, paintings, poems, and plays (if we shall call them information), how 
a piece of work moves me may be totally different from how it affects oth-
ers. The information is subjective in the sense that the meaning of such is 
only experienced by me. I might feel differently or have a different opin-
ion about Sartre’s existentialism a day or a year later, but this subjective 
information does not matter to others, for the meaning of the text as I 
have interpreted it is not, nor ought to be, communicated with or totally un-
derstood by others. The situation will change, of course, if I were to publish 
a scholarly article with the intention of communicating my experience 
with others; my interpretation will then become public and be subject to 
contestation and criticism.
In Habermas’s (1984) discussion of formal ontological categories, the 
subjective realm references our personal desires, intentions, and feel-
ings. The mental states are subjective not because they cannot be shared 
but because the understanding as such—for example, how I feel about 
a piece of classical music—can never be totally understood by others in 
completely the same way because they have different experiences that 
create their subjective being and experiencing of the world. Hence, un-
like private information, subjective information does not operate within 
a communication system until one shares the feeling or opinion about a 
piece of work or an instance of information with others.
While subjective information is also understood situationally, the 
situation in question is mainly concerned with the state of one’s mind. 
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Encountering a real-world situation may invoke past experiences, 
thoughts, and feelings that create an instance of subjective information; 
however, this instance is different from understanding the meaning of 
private information. Private information, as we have been using the term, 
operates within a communication system and hence a shared meaning is 
a necessary condition and the situation (or context) is a sufficient condi-
tion, whereas subjective information operates within one’s mind, and unless 
one intends to share the meaning with others, a shared meaning is not 
a necessary condition. Hence, private information and subjective infor-
mation should be understood differently, although in both cases, the in-
stance of information is interpreted within a certain context—a situation. 
But how is the distinction between private and subjective information im-
portant for information science?
The cognitive viewpoint of information science (Belkin, 1990; Brookes, 
1980) is most concerned with subjective information—specifically, the in-
teraction between information and mental or knowledge states—and may 
have been instrumental in introducing the user’s perspectives in IS. How-
ever, if we were to study subjective information, we would study the me-
chanical processing of such information in our brains or the psychology 
of interpretation. These studies are largely undertaken in brain sciences, 
neurosciences, and psychology; often, these studies attempt to correlate 
neurological effects and stimuli and mental reasoning. The object of such 
kinds of study is not “information,” but the workings of our brains and 
minds. In other words, the study of the interaction between information 
and mental states, strictly speaking, is not a study of information but how 
our brains function or how we feel about certain things—say, how a piece 
of music moves us. These topics are very much worth exploring and study-
ing, but it seems that we cannot study subjective information on its own 
in IS, not to mention that the study of information in the sense of subjec-
tive information has resulted in the conceptualization of information that 
implicates a causal relationship between information and human minds 
(Ma, 2012a).
Private information, private as it is, is of no concern to those outside 
of the small group where the meaning is shared. Hence, private informa-
tion has been of little interest to IS—unless the information is to become 
more broadly public.1 Indeed, we have always been interested in personal 
correspondences in special collections and the like; that is, when private 
information becomes public and is open for public consumption, scrutiny, 
or appreciation. All in all, the investigation of private and subjective infor-
mation turns us to see how Wilson’s (1977) notion of public knowledge 
would be most relevant to IS, and how public knowledge is inherently 
objective.
Let us go back to our story about a sign on a tree.
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Public Knowledge
Remember that the sign on a tree is an example of private information 
that was shared between my friend and me. The information of that sign 
was not legible or even seen by others; for them, the physical tag on or 
modification of the tree was not informative. But if I join a hiking club 
and share the meaning of the sign on a tree with the club members, then 
this private information becomes more public. This information—the 
sign on a tree—is still somewhat private, but before long, the sign on a 
tree has been mentioned in blog posts and online forums. The sign on a 
tree is no longer understood by only my friend and me but by a commu-
nity of hikers. The private information has become public as the existence 
and the meaning of the sign are now known within and outside of the 
community of hikers. The sign is for public consumption as long as one 
knows about its existence and meaning. 
If one is an avid hiker, one could find many signs in the woods. Some 
tell you what plants are edible or poisonous; some indicate directions, 
while others are inherently private, such as “Leo and Shadow were here.” 
Hikers alike depend on the information—the signs on trees—to navigate 
the woods, to find food and water, and to avoid harmful substances and 
predatory animals. They agree that the signs are informative, or at least 
potentially informative (for example, if one gets lost). For those who have 
no interests in the woods or hiking, these signs may be generally useless 
and are not informative in the same way as for those hiking, for they rare-
ly, if ever, go into the woods or see the signs, but they would likely agree 
that these signs are information. 
But, say, one fine day, the newly elected mayor, who has not been in 
the woods since her fifth-grade field trip, pays a visit to the national for-
est. Never mind the natural wonders—the mayor knows little about what 
food looks like before it is prepared and cooked; indeed, she has been liv-
ing and working in very hygienic (artificially, that is) environments since 
childhood. Messiness and untidiness bother her. When she sees the scars 
on the trees, meaningless to her (as such, they are scars, not signs!), she 
suggests a beautifying project of the forest by removing the signs, or scars.
The community denounces the proposal immediately. They reason 
that the markings on the trees are not scars, but signs: they have mean-
ings, they are information, they should be public knowledge! Without 
them, people would get lost in the woods, and they would not be able to 
distinguish food from poison. The signs are information that ought to be 
preserved, not erased. Fortunately, their reasons are accepted; it is clear 
that there is a consensus among the community members that the signs 
should be treated as information, as public knowledge. The signs on trees 
are there to stay.
Not only are the signs not to be erased, but new displays and catalogs 
are created for deciphering the signs and for preserving cultural heritage. 
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In the future, few would argue that the displays and the catalogs are not 
information, although very few would know about the story of the erasure 
of the signs on trees. 
The Objectivity of Public Knowledge
Thus, one may ask: Can we draw a line between private information and 
public knowledge? In the case of the upside-down coffee cup, we could 
argue that it is certainly a case of private information, since the meaning 
of the sign is only shared among family members within a certain context. 
It is also clear that the information is not going to be preserved for public 
consumption in the future, but may be recited orally to future genera-
tions as a fond memory of the family. 
In the case of the signs on trees, we could not pinpoint a time in his-
tory when the signs are no longer private information and have become 
public knowledge—that is, what we usually refer to as information in IS. 
Nevertheless, the construction of public knowledge is inarguably social 
and discursive and largely depends on the justification that the signs—the 
information—ought to be considered as information. In an ideal situation, 
what ought to be information shall be an agreement, or at least a consen-
sus, among the community members (Buckland, 1991). This means, as 
well, however, that signs can be contested as not being informative for a 
given public. Public knowledge is constituted by the ability of community 
members to contest the meanings of signs and practices in relation to the 
world—that is, to contest what is and is not considered to be informative 
and/or cultural heritage. The contestation, as in the case of the sign on 
a tree, is based on reasons: the justification given to the claims of informa-
tion. The sign in and of itself is not self-evident as information or public 
knowledge.
While group consensus alone does not constitute knowledge, such 
consensus is required for information claims (Ma, 2013). What makes in-
formation “public” is that its claims, not its signs, are negotiated through 
communicative action. Public knowledge refers to signs, records, and 
practices that we ought to preserve and organize for public consump-
tion and future retrieval. In this sense, public information is an “objective 
matter” (Wilson, 1983)—objective because the cultural forms and social 
norms that make up knowledge claims are common, large-scale tokens 
for agents’ communicative actions. 
The norm that something ought to be collected, preserved, organized, 
and made accessible, in other words that something ought to be consid-
ered as public knowledge, is not subject to individual members’ behaviors 
or attitudes. In the story of the sign on a tree, the consensus depends on 
cultural and social norms that see something as a meaningful sign that 
has social meaning in its deployment. Such signs are recognized as impor-
tant information, and the “ought” signifies the moral imperative that the 
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information or sign be preserved. That is to say, even if a person did not 
agree that the sign leads to knowledge, he or she would still agree that the 
sign should be preserved based on the moral imperative—what is called 
“conceptual norms” in Brandom’s (1994) philosophy, quoted at length 
here:
Interpreting a community as exhibiting original intentionality is tak-
ing its members to adopt the discursive scorekeeping stance toward 
each other. The content-conferring norms and proprieties that an 
interpreter who attributes discursive scorekeeping practices takes to 
be implicit in them have a number of important structural features. 
Central among them is the fact that the conceptual norms implicit in 
the practices attributed to a community outrun the nonnormatively 
specifiable behavioral discriminations members of that community are 
disposed to make. For this reason, conceptual norms can be understood 
as objective, and so as binding alike on all members of a discursive com-
munity, regardless of their particular attitudes. This feature of attribu-
tions of linguistic practices secures the sense in which concepts and 
the commitments they involve concerning appropriate circumstances 
and consequences of application can be understood to be shared, in 
spite of the many differences of attitude that correspond to the differ-
ent scorekeeping perspectives of the discursive practitioners who keep 
track of each other’s statuses. (p. 631; emphasis in original)
Conceptual norms have objective status because they are embedded 
in practices as a result of the “discursive scorekeeping” of community 
members, and also because the conceptual norms are binding among the 
members, like “rules” in Wittgenstein’s (1958) language-game. The con-
ceptual norms for retaining the signs on trees are based on the reasons ac-
cepted by the community, regardless of their individual opinions about it. 
It is thus the communicative action that serves as the bases of conceptual 
norms. Consequently, the notion of information in cultural heritage car-
ries the sense of recognized signs that constitute normative-objective status. 
All these norms are the intellectual and practical frameworks that consti-
tute the evidentiary nature of information. As a consequence, the cognitive 
authority of information professionals involves their preservation of such 
signs in their moral, social, and cultural contexts (Wilson, 1983). 
Conclusion
This paper began with the question, can information be subjective and/
or objective? in order to explore the nature of information that is most 
relevant to IS. To answer the question, we have investigated the notion of 
private information against subjective information and public knowledge. 
Information is private when the meanings of a sign or a practice are only 
shared among certain members, but not with a community at large, al-
though we understand that sometimes there may not be a clear boundary 
between private and public information. We have also made clear that 
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private information is not equivalent to subjective information because 
subjective information is only relevant to a person’s own interpretation or 
opinion, and the meaning of such is not shared by and can never be fully 
understood by others. Notwithstanding, we make sense of information—
private, subjective, or public—situationally.
Further, we have come to the conclusion that when information is per-
ceived as public knowledge, it must be objective in the sense of “agreed 
upon” and so constitutes the signs, both tangible and intangible, for know-
ing activities and knowledge. What is information in the present depends 
on agreements as to the relation of words and signs in regard to knowledge 
claims. But knowledge claims require contestation and negotiation of the 
various different senses of the world within a common language, which 
reflects and gives linguistic cohesion to a life-world. A sign on a tree or 
a two-hundred-year-old ritual is not self-evident as public knowledge, as 
information; rather, it is the claims of information that make a sign or a 
practice public knowledge. Ideally, as in our story of the sign on a tree, 
and perhaps in the case of Wikipedia (Reagle, 2010), the information 
claims are based on the reasons raised by the members of a community. 
The communicative process implies the importance of conceptual norms 
in making public knowledge. 
The role of conceptual norms entails that we ought to consider history 
and cultures, and more importantly, we ought to think about the behavior 
of collectives rather than personal psychology when studying information-
related phenomena. This is not to deny the importance of agency, but 
the concepts of collective agency and collective responsibility are well worth 
exploring. 
Nevertheless, as a community or society grows, authority is often given 
to “experts” for making decisions on behalf of the public. Wilson (1977) 
states that “social recognition of a group is the process that converts pri-
vate beliefs into public knowledge” (p. 17). In fact, most information 
stored, preserved, and organized today is not usually co-constructed by 
the public based on communicative actions; rather, the construction of 
information infrastructures and the making of public knowledge are the 
responsibility of information professionals, broadly construed. As the 
quantity of digitized and born-digital data is increasing by the second, 
increasingly it is in the hands of information professionals, who hold the 
authority bestowed by the public to determine what may become public 
knowledge. To think of information as “objective” then, leaves us with 
the questions concerning the collective responsibility in collecting, pre-
serving, and organizing information, including what we call “big data.” 
If information professionals are to be the stewards and record-keepers 
of our past, present, and future, let us not forget the considerable moral 
obligations and historical transmissions of institutions by which we serve.
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Note
 1. The use of private information in big-data analytics warrants a separate treatment, however.
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